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JONATHAN GINZBURG
FRAGMENTING MEANING: CLARIFICATION ELLIPSIS
AND NOMINAL ANAPHORA
1. Introduction
One of the most commonplace contextual eﬀects of an utterance is the
potential for phrasal clariﬁcation ellipses (CE), exempliﬁed in (1a), in
which an attempt is made to clarify one or more constituents of the
previous utterance. An utterance such as B’s in (1b2) has at least two
types of readings: one reading (the clausal reading) is paraphraseable
as (1c), where the capitalized ‘JACK’ is to be construed as focussed.
The other reading (the constituent reading) is paraphrasable by (1d).1
(1) a. 1. A: Did Jill kowtow?
2. B: Jill?
3. B: Who?
4. B: Kowtow?
5. B: Did what?
b. 1. A: Is Jack in town?
2. B: Jack?
c. clausal reading: Are you asking whether JACK is in town?
d. constituent reading: Who is the person named Jack you were
referring to?
1 This reading is only one of a number of understandings which could
concern themselves also with clarifying the phonology and even perhaps also
the syntax of a given constituent’s utterance. I will ignore these other under-
standings in the sequel, though their existence merely strengthens a general
point I will be making, namely the need to preserve a highly structured and
hybrid representation of a given utterance event in the context. For a more
general account, which does provide an analysis of such non-semantic readings
see Cooper and Ginzburg, in preparation. That paper also relates utterance
processing to issues in the representation of the attitudes.
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2 JONATHAN GINZBURG
As illustrated in (2) the constituent/clausal ambiguity can, in principle,
arise equally with any syntactic type of contituent, as in the case of a
verbal constituent.2
(2) a. A: Did Jack kowtow at the party?
B: Kowtow?
b. clausal reading: Are you asking if Jack KOWTOWED?
c. constituent reading: what did you mean when you said ‘kow-
tow’?
CE, on both clausal and constituent readings, does not respect sub-
jacency or similar constraints on extraction, as illustrated in the wh–
island ‘violating’ (3a). Both readings of CE do involve parallelism with
the antecedent. The constituent reading seems to actually require phono-
logical identity. With clausal readings, however, things are more subtle.
On the other hand, (3b-d) show that partial syntactic parallelism does
obtain: an XP used to clarify an antecedent subutterance u1 must
match u1 categorially, though there is no requirement of phonological
identity:3
(3) a. A: Mary told me who Bill kowtowed to at Jill’s party.
B: Bill?/kowtowed?
b. A: I phoned him.
B: him?/#he?
c. A: Did he adore the book.
B: adore?/#adored?
2 There are exceptions, nonetheless. For instance, not surprisingly expletive
constituents cannot be so clariﬁed, as shown by (i) and (ii):
(i) A: Did she leave? B: #Did?
(ii) A: It’s raining. B: #It?
As Yehuda Falk has pointed out to me, there are also non-expletives that seem
to resist such clariﬁcation:
(iii) A: Will she leave? B: #Will?
A precise characterization of the class of non-clariﬁable constituents I leave
to future research.
3 David Tugwell suggested to me the distinction between clausal and
constituent readings on this score.
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d. A: We’re leaving?
B: You?
Note also that CE is not local—its antecedent need not be the most
recent utterance, as required by any approach to ellipsis resolution that
relies in some way on adjacency or on a buﬀer containing the syntactic
structure of the ‘previous utterance’ (see e.g. Sag and Hankamer, 1984;
Kehler, 1993):
(4) A: I trust John can write a thoughtful preface.
B: John?
A: John Crabbe.
B: mmh. Thoughtful?
A: Not too rash.
CE constitutes a highly interesting resolution process: it is demonstra-
bly not one amenable to a syntactically-based account (in the sense
that one could derive the required readings oﬀ some reconstructed
form) and yet it clearly displays signiﬁcant parallelism eﬀects. Thus,
CE poses serious problems for reconstruction-based approaches to bare
ellipsis (e.g. Reinhart, 1991; Lappin and Gregory, 1997). For a start,
such approaches would ﬁnd the partial nature of the syntactic paral-
lelism problematic. More seriously perhaps are the semantic problems:
the required readings for CE cannot be derived. Reinhart’s approach
couched in a Government Binding framework is based on LF movement
of the XP construed as a generalized quantiﬁer which predicates of a
predicate formed by the λ-abstracting over the antecedent clause. Such
an approach cannot generate clausal readings without assuming that
illocutionary force is syntactically represented in the antecedent, an
obviously problematic assumption. For constituent readings of CE the
situation is even worse— there does not seem to be any obvious way for
these accounts to generate readings remotely approximating the desired
content. Lappin and Gregory’s HPSG approach involves copying the
head daughter of the VP heading the clause in the previous conjunct
and constructing an assignment of the elements of the fragment site to
the copied verb’s SUBCAT list. Generating a clausal reading would
involve minimally assuming illocutionary information is represented
somehow in the verb’s semantics. As with Reinhart’s approach, there
seems no way to get at constituent readings. A system based on Higher
Order Uniﬁcation (HOU) (see e.g. Dalrymple, Pereira and Shieber,
1991; Pulman, 1997) could do better than the reconstruction-based
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.3
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approaches: assuming the existence of theories of context and paral-
lelism that would set up the requisite equations, the requisite clausal
clariﬁcation reading could be generated using HOU. However, there is
no obvious way to extend such a system to provide constituent readings.
In this paper I will oﬀer a proposal for a syntactic and semantic
analysis of CE which combines kos(see e.g. Ginzburg, 1996; 1998;
forthcoming; Cooper, Larsson, Poesio, Traum and Matheson, 1999) and
Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) (see e.g. Pollard and
Sag, 1994; Ginzburg and Sag, 2000). kos4 is a framework for describing
dialogue interaction based on combining insights from dialogue games
approaches with a situation-theoretic semantic framework. The frame-
work enables one to provide a uniform view of contextual change due
to either illocutionary or utterance acts. In (Ginzburg, 1999) it was
suggested that an adequate account of certain elliptical phenomena in
dialogue motivates the need for postulating meanings which encode
presuppositions concerning the structure of previously occuring utter-
ances. The analysis of CE I will propose involves a generalization of
this idea—replacing the purely semantic contents situation semantics
has exploited hitherto with invariants that characterize an utterance
semantically and syntactically. Technically, this will be implemented
by breaking up contents into pairs of abstracts over contents carrying
structural–restrictions (‘meaning’) and assignments to these abstracts
(‘context’). This view of context is inspired by recent work on informa-
tion states using type theory (Cooper, 1998). My claim will be that this
innovation provides koswith the means of developing a general theory
of anaphoric and ellipsis processing for dialogue, though my focus here
will be on nominal anaphora.
The setting for which approaches such as DRT or DPL were designed
is monologue or text. Indeed, these as most formal semantic models,
have hitherto abstracted away from issues pertaining to interaction such
as the fact that in conversation one participant’s utterances need not
be accepted or indeed comprehended by the other participants. The
consequence of this has been that many actually occurring dialogue
contributions cannot be analysed, in particular those whose primary
function is to indicate comprehension or the need for clariﬁcation.
However, even if one limits attention to explicating anaphoric possibil-
ities, dialogue poses challenges of its own. I point out here some such
problems, none of which besets all current approaches, but conversely
4 Kos is the name of an island, not an acronym; ‘k’ pertains to konversation
and ‘s’ to semantics.
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it is probably correct that no well-established framework can deal with
most of these problems:
The ﬁrst phenomenon, recently discussed under the rubric of cross-
speaker anaphora (see e.g. Dekker, 1997), concerns the fact that nom-
inal anaphoric use does not require acceptance by B of A’s assertion:
(5) A: A priest was looking for you.
B: He’s not a priest just an actor and I doubt he wanted to see
me.
This phenomenon is particularly diﬃcult for approaches in which anapho-
ra is resolved with reference to a description built out of previous text
(e.g. E-type anaphora on certain construals, and also for DRT and
certain versions of DPL).
In fact, anaphora can even occur when one DP has not fully under-
stood his interlocuter. In (6) B need not be able to resolve A’s reference
to Jill, but can use the utterance A has made to describe her:
(6) A: Did Jill call?
B: Is she the new computer oﬃcer?
Analyzing such cases requires a notion of partial understanding of an
utterance, which is as yet absent from the afore-mentioned frameworks.
Most dynamic frameworks develop notions of pronominal accessibili-
ty which if ‘turned on’ intersententially cannot be subsequently ‘turned
oﬀ’– Asher’s SDRT (Asher, 1993) is a notable exception in this regard.
However, it is a robust fact, well noted in the AI literature on anaphora
resolution (see e.g. Grosz and Sidner, 1986) that changing the topic of
conversation drastically changes anaphoric possibilities. Thus, in (7),
line 5 ‘he’ cannot felicitously refer to Jake, despite the fact that the
equivalent utterance using a directly referential expression is perfectly
coherent:
(7) 1. A: Jake hit Bill.
2. B: No, he patted him on the back.
3. A: Ah. Is Bill going to the party tomorrow?
4. B: No.
5. A: Is #he/Jake?
A systematic underdetermination of anaphoric possibilities for approach-
es where anaphora is triggered by NP uses in a text (or monologue)
(e.g. DRT or DPL) is that in most cases in dialogue an alternative
resolution of anaphora to visual/acoustic entities is possible:
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.5
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(8) [Context: a shot is heard, followed by a woman’s scream:]
A: Oh boy, she sounds scared.
In the paper I will suggest that an account of nominal anaphora ad-
equate for dialogue and which can, in particular, oﬀer a more or less
uniﬁed account to this set of problems, emerges by combining (a) an
account of how Dialogue Participants (DPs) interact over the content of
utterances with (b) a situation-based view of deﬁnite reference (see e.g.
(Barwise and Perry, 1983; Cooper, 1996; Poesio, 1993; Milward, 1995)).
For reasons of space I will restrict attention here to anaphora to non-
quantiﬁed antecedents. I start by providing some relevant background
about kos. I then move to consider how the view of utterance process-
ing hitherto developed in koscan be exploited to provide an analysis
of CE. With the reﬁnenement in hand, I discuss how a treatment of
nominal anaphora can be developed.
2. kos: Background and Tools
2.1. The Structure of the DGB
kosstarts out from the assumption that conversational rules involve
updates by each CP of her own dialogue-gameboard (DGB), a quasi-
public informational repository (cf. Hamblin’s individual commitment
slate, (Hamblin, 1970)). The following view of DGB structure is as-
sumed:
The DGB is structured by at least the following attributes:
− FACTS: a set of facts, closed (cf. Asher 1993) under meets and
joins;
− QUD(‘questions under discussion’) : a set consisting of the cur-
rently discussable questions, partially ordered by ≺ (‘takes conver-
sational precedence’).
− LATEST-MOVE: the content of latest illocutionary move made
/ understood—‘A asserted that p’, ‘A asked q’ etc.5
5 A more complex view of this attribute emerges later.
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2.2. kos: Basic Notions
DEFINITION 1. Given a question q, an utterance u is q–speciﬁc iﬀ
content(u) is either ABOUT q or INFLUENCES q.6
DEFINITION 2. If L-M = ‘A ASSERTS p’, an utterance u is an
adjacency pair for L-M iﬀ content(u) is p?–speciﬁc or content(u) is
‘B accepts p’.
DEFINITION 3. If L-M = ‘A ASKS q’, an utterance u is an adjacency
pair for L-M iﬀ content(u) is q–speciﬁc.
2.3. TOPICALITY
In (Ginzburg, 1997) I argued for the need to recognize a (TOPICAL v.
STORED) dichotomy between two types of ‘presupposed information-
al items’: the former enter into FACTS via a ‘short-term’, defeasible
repository structured by the elements of QUD. The latter are facts
that either (after potentially being discussed) have been stored long-
term or arise as side eﬀects to issues that were never explicitly under
discussion. This proposed dichotomy is inspired in part by work on fact
and propositional anaphora in texts by (Webber, 1991; Asher, 1993)
and enables one to propose a purely semantic, dialogical version of
the Right Frontier Constraint (RFC) proposed for texts, based on an
analogy that relates the text-derived notion of open constituent (‘unex-
hausted topic’) with the dialogue–derived notion of question currently
under discussion.
Formally, the distinction is captured by positing two distinct repos-
itories within FACTS: STORED is modelled classically as a set of facts
closed under meets and joins. TOPICAL is treated as a set of pairs of
a = 〈question0,fact0〉, where question0 (a’s address) is an element of
QUD, fact0 is ABOUT q0. TOPICAL is updated using priority union
(Carpenter, 1993), a defeasible update operation in which later accept-
ed material takes precedence, hence allowing for an account of hasty
6 ‘ABOUT’ is a notion of partial answerhood empirically and formally
characterized, together with the agent relative notion of exhaustiveness ‘RE-
SOLVES’, in (Ginzburg, 1995). ‘INFLUENCES’ (or its converse: DEPENDS)
is a sort of entailment relation between questions. It can be explicated in
terms of the aboutness and resolvedness relations: q2 INFLUENCES q1 iﬀ any
proposition p such that p Resolves q2, also satisﬁes p About q1. See (Ginzburg,
1996; Ginzburg, 2001) for discussion.
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accommodation. As far as querying and assertion: in this revised setup
updating QUD has the additional consequence of introducing a new
address in TOPICAL about which facts can be provided, together
initially with the trivial fact . In addition, when a new question gets
introduced, the addresses for questions that are no longer under discus-
sion are downdated from TOPICAL. This latter assumption represents
an initial version of the RFC, which is generalized in a subsequent
section:
(9) It is precisely the facts in FACTS | TOPICAL to whom
access by ellipsis and pronominal anaphora is possible.
2.4. Ellipsis and Structural Presuppositions
(Ginzburg, 1999) proposed an account of short answer resolution in
dialogue that is semantically–based, but which also encodes as presup-
positions syntactic parallelism requirements. (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000)
oﬀer an HPSG reformulation of that proposal within a more general
framework which attempts to provide an exhaustive characterization of
the declarative and interrogative phrasal types of English. I summarize
this proposal, which is restricted for the moment to nominal fragments:7
as an initial step, Ginzburg and Sag posit two new attributes within
the context (ctxt) feature structure of HPSG: Maximal Question
Under Discussion (max-qud), whose value is of sort question;8 and
Salient Utterance (sal utt), whose value is a set of elements of type
sign. The feature sal-utt represents a distinguished constituent of the
utterance whose content is the current value of max-qud. In informa-
tion structure terms, it can be thought of as specifying a potential
parallel element. Since it is a sign, it enables one to encode syntactic
and phonological parallelism. Speciﬁcally, sal-utt is computed as the
(sub)utterance associated with the role bearing widest scope within
max-qud:
7 An implementation of this system which covers short answers and sluicing
is described in (Ginzburg et al., 2001).
8 In this framework, questions are represented as semantic objects compris-
ing a set of param(eter)s—that is, restricted indices—and a proposition.
This is the feature structure counterpart of a propositional abstract, which
Ginzburg and Sag argue in great detail is what questions are.
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− For Wh-questions, sal-utt is the wh-phrase associated with the
params set of the question.9
− If max-qud is a question with an empty params set, the context is
underspeciﬁed for sal-utt. Its possible values are either the empty
set or the utterance associated with the widest scoping quantiﬁer
in max-qud. This will be invoked to resolve sluicing.
In Ginzburg and Sag’s account information about phrases is speciﬁed
by cross-classifying them in a multi-dimensional type hierarchy. Phrases
are classiﬁed not only in terms of their phrase structure schema or X-
bar type, but also with respect to a further informational dimension
of clausality. Clauses are divided into inter alia declarative clauses
(decl-cl), which denote propositions, and interrogative clauses (inter-cl)
denoting questions. Each maximal phrasal type inherits from both these
dimensions. This classiﬁcation allows one to specify systematic correla-
tions between clausal construction types and types of semantic content.
To account for elliptical constructions such as short answers, sluicing,
and CE, Ginzburg and Sag posit a phrasal type headed-fragment-phrase
(hd-frag-ph)—a subtype of hd-only-ph—governed by the constraint in
(10). The various fragments analyzed here will be subtypes of hd-frag-ph
or else will contain such a phrase as a head daughter.10
(10) hd-frag-ph:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
head v
ctxt|sal-utt
[
cat 1
cont|index 2
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ → H
⎡
⎣cat 1
[
head nominal
]
cont|index 2
⎤
⎦
This constraint has two signiﬁcant eﬀects. First, it ensures that the
category of the head daughter—restricted to be n(oun) or p(reposition),
the two subtypes of nominal—is identical to that speciﬁed by the con-
textually provided sal-utt. The mother is speciﬁed to be of category
v, which will allow such phrases to serve as stand-alone clauses and also
to function as the complement of a verb that selects for clauses, but
not for NPs. Second, the constraint coindexes the head daughter with
9 More generally, the utterance associated with the params set when this is
non-empty. This can arise when the antecedent is not an interrogative clause,
for example in the CE examples discussed below. In such cases, sal-utt will
be the utterance of the constituent to be clariﬁed.
10 The constraint here relates the mother to its (sole) daughter, denoted
with a large bold faced H.
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the sal-utt. This will have the eﬀect of ‘unifying in’ the content of
the former into a contextually provided content.
The ﬁrst subtype of hd-frag-ph I consider here is one used to analyze
short answers and (clausal readings of) CE. (11) is the constraint char-
acterizing declarative-fragment-clause (decl-frag-cl)—also a subtype of
decl-cl:
(11) decl-frag-cl:⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
store Σ1
cont
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
sit 2
soa
[
quants order(Σ3 ) ⊕ A
nucl 5
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
max-qud
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
question
params neset
prop
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
proposition
sit 2
soa
[
quants A
nucl 5
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
→ H
[
store Σ3 ∪ Σ1 set(param)
]
The content of this phrasal type is a proposition. The information in
this constraint derives primarily from the context: whereas in most
headed clauses the content is entirely (or primarily) derived from the
head daughter, here it is constructed for the most part from the contex-
tually salient question. This provides the concerned situation and the
nucleus, whereas if the fragment is (or contains) a quantiﬁer, that quan-
tiﬁer must outscope any quantiﬁers already present in the contextually
salient question. Finally, the constraint also ensures that if the head
daughter contributes a parameter to the store (due to the presence of a
wh-phrase), that parameter remains stored. A simple example follows:
(12) A: Who left?
B: Jo
Here A’s (sub)utterance of who is the sal-utt:
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(13) ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
cat NP
cont
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
param
index 1
rest
{}
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
store
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
param
index 1
rest
{
person( 1 )
}
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
And the full utterance makes the following question max-qud:
(14)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
question
params
⎧⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣index 1
restr
{
person( 1 )
}
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
prop
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
proposition
sit s
soa
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
quants
〈〉
nucl
[
leave-rel
leaver 1
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
B’s utterance thus gets the analysis in (15).
3. Interacting over Utterances: Motivation for
Structured Representation of Utterances
(Ginzburg, 1998) develops a view of utterance understanding and up-
dates which can be summarized as follows: for an addressee B, as soon
as she forms the belief that an utterance u has taken place whose
meaning she recognizes to be μ, she needs to consider the question
content(u,A,μ(u))? (‘what did A intend to convey with u whose
meaning is μ?’): this is a complex question obtained by conjoining
the (conventional) content question CONTENT(u, μ)? and the goals
question GOALS(u,A)?. Roughly: CONTENT(u, μ)? is the question
individuated by the utterance u and μ, the abstract corresponding to
the (Kaplan/situation semantics view of) sentential meaning used in u,
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.11
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(15) S⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
decl-frag-cl
cont
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
proposition
sit 1
soa|nucl 2
[
leave-rel
leaver 4
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
ctxt
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
max-qud
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
question
params
⎧⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣index 4
restr
{
person( 4 )
}
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
prop
⎡
⎢⎣propositionsit 1
soa|nucl 2
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
sal-utt
[
cat 6
cont|index 4
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎣ss|loc
[
cat 6NP
cont|index 4
]⎤
⎦
Jo
in other words the n-ary SOA abstract where the variables abstracted
over correspond to the contextual parameters. Thus, CONTENT(u, μ)?
can be paraphrased as (‘what values do the contextual parameters of
μ get in u’); GOALS(u,A)? is the question ‘what goals did A have
in making u’. It is only if B believes she knows answers suﬃcient-
ly detailed for her current purposes to content(u,A,μ(u))?, i.e. to
both CONTENT(u, μ)? and to GOALS(u,A)?, that she can proceed
to update her DGB, updating L-M with the content of u and acting
in accordance with the illocutionary act that this speciﬁes; otherwise a
clariﬁcation stage must ensue.11 This clariﬁcation stage can be charac-
11 For simplicity in the current paper I ignore the role of GOALS(u, a)?
entirely.
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terized with signiﬁcant precision in kos: in those cases where B cannot
resolve content(u,A,μ(u))?, she makes content(u,A,μ(u))? QUD-
maximal. This has inter alia the consequence that B is constrained
now to provide an utterance which is content(u,A,μ(u))?–speciﬁc.
This includes the possibility of posing any question that INFLUENCES
content(u,A,μ(u))?.
The account as formulated in (Ginzburg, 1998) was based on a
standard situation semantic view of the relationship between meaning
and content: contents are SOAs (specifying illocutionary information,
speaker and descriptive content) and meanings are n-ary abstracts
over contents, where the variables abstracted over correspond to the
contextual parameters. However, this standard view does not jibe well
with CE: the central representational desideratum brought home by
the phenomenon of CE is that the semantic representation of an utter-
ance must be suﬃciently structured so as to allow the content of each
semantically potent subutterance to be maintained separately, as well
as representing the full content that arises by composing the contents of
the subutterances. Thus, one intrinsic problem for the view of meaning
situation semantics inherited from Kaplan is the a-prioristic decision as
to which constituents of content are to be adjudged context-dependent,
and therefore liable to be abstracted away as contextual parameters. To
deal with CE we need an altogether more equalitarian view—one which
makes at least all semantically potent constituents contribute parame-
ters which get instantiated with the corresponding subutterances. But
more is required apart from this hyper-structuriﬁcation of meanings.
On a standard syntax/semantics interface, the syntax has no role
beyond bringing about the composition of the content. With this task
achieved, the syntactic information might as well decay instantly. How-
ever, the parallelism data of CE reveal a diﬀerent story, one that treats
the syntax less cavalierly: just as we need a representation that pre-
serves the content of each semantically potent subutterance, we need
also to preserve in some way minimally the local syntactic features of
each such subutterance. The representation needed, then, should not
only be highly structured on the semantic front, it also needs to be
hybrid in nature—encompassing semantic and syntactic information.
We should, consequently, no longer think of the contextual impact
of utterances as essentially described by their fully composed semantic
content, but rather as one to be described in terms of an altogether
more structured and hybrid representational entity, one that reiﬁes
the history of the construction of the utterance. Of course, this rep-
resentation must be such as to allow a standard semantic content
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to be ‘read’ oﬀ it somehow, but not at the price of losing all other
information that has emerged during the utterance event. Incidentally,
this view has suggestive independent support from work on memory
for conversations—see (Fletcher, 1994) for a review of psycholinguistic
evidence for three distinct types of memory traces, the surface form,
the propositional text base, and the situational model.
There are a number of ways to go about modelling the required
representational entity, which I shall dub —for want of a better term—
a Structured Utterance Invariant (SUIT). Here I follow the approach
developed within a type theoretical framework by (Cooper, 1998).12 A
SUIT will consist of of a pair of an n-ary abstract (the utt(erance)-
skel(eton)—an object reifying the history of the construction of the
utterance meaning) and a contextual assignment (cntxt-ass), whose
range comprises tokens corresponding to perceived (sub)utterance-events
and utterance content-like objects such as referents and properties. This
abstract/assignment pair is constrained by the fact that applying the
abstract to the assignment must yield the full compositional content.
The roles speciﬁed by the abstract are roles corresponding to each se-
mantically potent constituent and carry appropriacy restrictions. These
appropriacy restrictions are the locus for encoding, inter alia, syntac-
tic conditions which utterance tokens associated with such roles must
meet. I assume that the contents which update QUD and TOPICAL
preserve this partition into utterance skeleton and context-assignment.
A simple example of a SUIT is given in (16).
To summarize: in this section I have proposed a revision to the
standard situation theoretic notions of meaning and content, motivated
primarily by the phenomenon of CE. The upshot of this is the posit-
ing of SUITs—structured utterance invariants, where both type-like
information concerning the structure of the utterance (the utterance–
skeleton), as well as information about sub-utterance and referent to-
kens (the contextual assignment) is represented. Of course the goals
underlying this move go beyond providing a treatment of CE. CE,
by forcing us to preserve in the context a highly structured and hybrid
representation, opens up the prospects of developing kosinto a general
theory of anaphora and ellipsis resolution for dialogue. This by deﬁning
abstraction and substitution operations over SUIT’s within the general
contextual framework provided by kos. In the current paper I will
illustrate some of the possibilities by sketching ﬁrst an analysis of
12 (Ginzburg and Cooper, 2001) show how a close variant on an HPSG sign
can ﬁll the function of an utterance skeleton.
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(16) a. Bill relies on Jill.
b.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
utt-skel
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λA, s, ubill, b, ujill, j, urely, R
〈〈 Assert, A, (s ! 〈〈 R,b,j 〉〉) 〉〉
restrictions
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
〈〈 =,b,content(ubill) 〉〉,
〈〈 =,j,content(ujill) 〉〉,
〈〈 SPEAKER,A 〉〉,
〈〈 =,content(urely),R 〉〉,
〈〈 =,NP[+nom],cat(uwho) 〉〉,
〈〈 =,PP[+on],cat(uonwhom) 〉〉,
〈〈 =,V[+pst],cat(urely) 〉〉
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
cntxt-ass
[
(ubill : u1, b : BILL, urely : u2,
A : A0, s0 : s0, ujill : u3, j : JILL, r : RELY )
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
CE and then proceeding to consider brieﬂy the problem of nominal
anaphora in dialogue.
4. Clarification Ellipsis: An account
In this section, I sketch the analysis I propose for CE. The analysis
has two essential components, contextual and grammatical: the former
concerns the contextual update which underpins a request for clariﬁ-
cation. This aspect I can, for reasons of space, only sketch brieﬂy and
informally; a detailed account can be found in (Ginzburg and Cooper,
2001; Ginzburg, 2001). The basic idea, common to both clausal and
constituent readings of CE, is that upon failure by a DP to resolve the
utterance skeleton associated with a perceived utterance, the utterance
skeleton is coerced, using a given set of coercion operations, to a new
utterance skeleton. This latter is one appropriate for the (partially
speciﬁed) contextual information available to the DP and its content
is a question. The second component concerns grammatical analysis,
where I follow (and in the case of constituent readings extend) the
analysis of (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000).
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4.1. Clausal Readings
I start by discussing clausal readings. If B chooses the clariﬁcation
option, she updates QUD with content(u,A,μ(u))? and above that
with a more speciﬁc question clar-q1, which she obtains from
content(u,A,μ(u))? by partially instantiating μ(u) with the values
for contextual variables she does have. The clausal reading for a CE
ellipse can now arise, using the type decl-frag-cl discussed above for
short answers. To illustrate, the analysis provided for (17a) involves
B introducing as QUD-maximal the question (paraphrased) in (16c)
and the sal-utt derives from A’s utterance of the NP Jo. The literal
reprise is thus analyzed as illustrated in (18).13
(17) a. A: Did Jo leave?
B: Jo?
b. Are you asking if JO left?
c. Whoi are you asking if i left.
4.2. Constituent Readings
A similar account can be developed for constituent readings, with one
important diﬀerence: by means of an operation on the utterance skele-
ton, QUD gets updated with a question which pertains to the content
of a sub-utterance. The fragment is then analyzed as a kind of hd-frag-
ph. The diﬀerence from the clausal case is that in constituent readings
the content of the fragment does not (directly) contribute
its conventional content to the clausal content. The function
of the fragment is, rather, to serve as an anaphoric element to the to–
be–clariﬁed sub-utterance. This anaphora is facilitated by phonological
identity requirement between the fragment and the sal-utt. The con-
tent derives entirely from max-qud. These two facets of constituent
readings are idiosyncratic to this construction and thus needs to be
stipulated. In (19) I posit a new phrasal type constit-repr-int-cl, a
subtype of head-frag-ph and of inter-cl.
13 The phrasal type dir-is-int-cl which constitutes the type of the mother
node in (18) is motivated in (Ginzburg and Sag, 2000) to deal with diverse
kinds of interrogatives including wh-in situ clauses such as Bill left when? and
intonation questions such as Bill left yesterday?.
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(18) S⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
dir-is-int-cl
cont
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
question
params
{}
prop 3
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
proposition
sit s
soa| nucl 4
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ask-rel
asker 5
msg-arg
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
question
params
{}
prop
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
proposition
sit 6
soa
[
leave-rel
leaver 2
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
S⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
decl-frag-cl
cont 3
ctxt
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
max-qud
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
question
params
{[
index 2
]}
prop 3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
sal-utt
[
cat 7
cont|index 2
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
[
cat 7NP
cont|index 2
]
JO
(19) constit-repr-int-cl:⎡
⎢⎢⎣
cont 1
ctxt
[
max-qud 1
sal-utt|phon 2
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ → H[phon 2 ]
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A simple example follows:
(20) a. A: Did Bo kowtow? B: Bo?
b. Who is the content of utterance u0 (the referent named Bo
referred to in the utterance of ‘Bo’)?⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
constit-repr-int-cl
cont 1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
question
params
⎧⎨
⎩
⎡
⎣index 3
restr
{
(named)(Bo)( 3 )
}
⎤
⎦
⎫⎬
⎭
prop
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
proposition
sit s
soa|nucl
⎡
⎢⎣
content-rel
utterance 2
ind 3
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
ctxt
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
max-qud 1
sal-utt
⎡
⎢⎣
phon 5
cat 4NP
cont|ind 3
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
hd-dtr
⎡
⎢⎣
phon 5
cat 4
cont|ind 3
⎤
⎥⎦
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
5. Nominal Anaphora/Ellipsis and Definite Reference
I now provide one further application of the revised framework: I indi-
cate how a theory of nominal anaphoric processing can be developed
by combining the perspective on utterance interaction developed above
and a situation-based view of deﬁnite reference.
5.1. Deictic deﬁnites
(21(2)) illustrates a key phenomenon for use of deﬁnites, one we have
already seen above in (5) for anaphora, in dialogue: the deﬁnite is
felicitous despite the fact that B does not accept A’s assertion:
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(21) A(1): John walked in.
B(2): The door was open?
The classical situation semantics treatment of deﬁnites (see e.g. (Bar-
wise and Perry, 1983; Gawron and Peters, 1990; Cooper, 1996; Poesio,
1993; Milward, 1995)) involves positing a resource situation, a contex-
tual parameter which can but need not be distinct from the described
situation. The resource situation underwrites existence and uniqueness.
A possible situation semantics account of (21(2)) in line with kosis
this: in (21(1)) A asserts the proposition (s0 ! 〈〈 ENTERED, j 〉〉),
where A is making reference to some situation s0. B having understood
(21(1)) does not accept the assertion, but rather makes (s0 ? 〈〈 EN-
TERED, j 〉〉) QUD–maximal. B’s query is licensed since he poses a
question which INFLUENCES (s0 ? 〈〈 ENTERED, j 〉〉), in particular
this means that the described situation of his question is s0. B believes
that it is commonly presupposed of s0, regardless of whether it supports
John’s walking in, that it has a unique door and this is why the deﬁnite
reference is possible.
Although certain key details remain to be worked out, such an ac-
count provides a relatively straightforward account of deﬁnite reference
as a dynamic process, which transfers readily to a dialogue setting: A
makes an utterance whose understanding involves reference to a situ-
ation; if B can resolve that reference, certain objects whose existence
within that situation can be inferred become available for reference
with deﬁnite descriptions.
What has been missing hitherto from most situation semantics ac-
counts is an account of:14
− The relation between resource situations and described situations:
which situations are available as resource situations when?
− How long is a given resource situation available for resolution and
what controls its availability?
− Where do resource situations reside in such a way as to be used
for resolution?
These issues become particularly acute when one considers pronominal
anaphora.
14 (Poesio, 1993; Milward, 1995) are notable exceptions which oﬀer highly
explicit accounts of certain aspects of all three issues.
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5.2. Pronominal Anaphora
In common with a variety of work (including (Hintikka and Kulas,
1985), (Milward, 1995)), I will treat third person pronouns as deﬁnite
descriptions: singular ones involve a uniqueness presupposition, where-
as plural ones a maximality presupposition. To what extent is such an
assimilation viable?15
The most obvious diﬀerence between the N-like deﬁnite descriptions
and anaphora is that the latter are not as easily inferable as the former:
(22) a. A(1): John walked in.
B(2): #It was open?
B(2’): He managed to get in?
(23) a. A: John walked straight past the door.
B: It was open?
This contrast is, arguably, a matter of degree: for a start, deixis makes
anaphors felicitous without an overt antecedent:
(24) a. [Context: a shot is heard, followed by a woman’s scream:] A:
Oh boy, she sounds scared.
b. A: There is something I have to tell you.
B: What?
A: I was pregnant and gave birth. She died a day after the
birth.
c. A couple sat down on a bench. He was annoyed, she wasn’t.
(From (Hintikka and Kulas, 1985))
Such examples suggest it is a mistake to incorporate an explicit an-
tecedent condition on nominal anaphora: optimally, what is desirable,
as noted by (Poesio, 1993), is a uniﬁed deictic/anaphoric meaning
15 See (Garrod and Sanford, 1994) for review of psycholinguistic evidence
demonstrating diﬀerences in processing pronouns and the N-like deﬁnite de-
scriptions. However, all evidence cited there concerns data from processing
text. Whether such diﬀerences extend to the processing of deictic pronouns
apparently remains to be extensively investigated.
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.20
FRAGMENTING MEANING 21
whose sole diﬀerence arises, in some sense, from the contextual re-
sources used. But here there is an apparent problem: (singular) anapho-
ra is of course possible even when there is more than one possible similar
gendered individual in the described situation:
(25) A: John likes Bill. He thinks he’s a nice kid.
Given the perspective of section 3 there is a well-motivated solution
available: we assume that the utterance situations of NPs constitute
available resource situations for deﬁnites. So the dynamic story about
reference presented in section 5.1 can now be generalized: referents
come in courtesy not just of the described situation, but also courtesy
of utterance situations, which enter in the DGB subsequent to utterance
update. More generally, we hypothesize the following generalization to
(9):
(26) It is the situations currently represented in the context assign-
ments of QUD/TOPICAL that constitute possible resource situ-
ations for deﬁnites.
An utterance situation for an NP will ﬁx:
− A referent (or witness/witness set for quantiﬁcational NPs)
− Agreement information
− Categorial information (recall parallelism constraints exhibited by
CE in section 4.)
Indeed in most languages gender agreement, to a greater or lesser ex-
tent, depends on grammatical information which does not inhere in
the referent independently of a given utterance. To take one example:
Hebrew, which lacks a neuter gender and correspondingly has no neuter
pronouns, has two words which correspond to the English car, one is
masculine, the other feminine. Subsequent pronominal reference must
agree with the gender of the antecedent:
(27) ledani yesh o´to yafe. hu kana oto´/#ota belondon.
Dani has car-masc nice-masc. he bought him/#her in-London.
Dani has a nice car. He bought it in London.
(28) ledani yesh mexonit yafa. hu kana #oto´/ota belondon.
Dani has car-fem nice-fem he bought #him/her in-London.
Dani has a nice car. He bought it in London.
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Basing anaphoric resolution on utterance situations allows both agree-
ment and referent identity information to be simultaneously in the
context for as long as the anaphoric potential exists. Agreement con-
stitutes a problem for dynamic systems where the only information
maintained concerns referents, as e.g. in DPL and in standard DRT.
Two additional semantic advantages for basing anaphoric dynamics on
an analysis as deﬁnites whose resource situations (can be) utterance
situations are these. First, we can explain how anaphora can occur in
cases where understanding is incomplete: in (6) repeated here as (29)
B need not be able to resolve A’s reference to Jill, but can use A’s
utterance A made to describe her:
(29) A: Did Jill call?/B: Is she the new secretary?
A second and related feature concerns a fundamental requirement for
anaphora in a dialogue setting, put forward in (Kamp, 1990) (see
also (Paul, 1996; Dekker, 1997)), that where correct understanding
has ensued the participants presuppose that they are talking about the
same thing. Within the current proposal this can be accounted for as
follows: B’s understanding an utterance u is based on her considering
whether she knows a suitably detailed answer to content(u,A,μ(u))?
In particular, such a fact will provide values for the (sub)utterances
of u. Understanding an anaphoric utterance requires of the DP B that
she believes she resolved the requisite resource situation, typically an
utterance situation, identically with A. Thus, regardless of whether B
can resolve the reference of that anaphoric use (as e.g. in (29)), B’s
grounding the utterance requires her to believe that they share the
belief about which is the resource situation for that anaphor.
Finally, let us see how the account can capture the topic change eﬀect
for anaphora: anaphora to a given entity is possible only insofar as s/he
is associated with a question currently under discussion: an NP use will
result in the utterance situation being in QUD, regardless of whether
it constitutes accepted information or not. There it will remain until
the question it is associated with gets downdated. In case information
is accepted, it remains in an address in TOPICAL, corresponding to
a question still in QUD.16 This process is illustrated sketchily in (30)
and (31):17
(30) a. QUD update resulting from A: Jake hit Bill.
16 For details, see (Ginzburg, 2001).
17 The notation QUD: p1?: μ?1[u1,u2] means that QUD contains the question
p1?, represented as a meaning (μ?1)/context-assignment(u1,u2] ) pair. The
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b.
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
utt-skel μ?1
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λs, u1,X, u2, Z
〈〈 (s ? 〈〈 HIT,hitt-er:X,hitee:Z 〉〉) 〉〉
restr| u1
{
〈〈 NAMED,‘jake’,X 〉〉, 〈〈 =,cont(u1),X 〉〉,
〈〈 AGR,3sg 〉〉, 〈〈 CAT,NP[+nom] 〉〉,
}
restr| u2
{
〈〈 NAMED,‘Bill’,X 〉〉, 〈〈 =,cont(u2),Y 〉〉,
〈〈 AGR,3sg 〉〉, 〈〈 CAT,NP[+acc] 〉〉
}
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
cntxt-ass
[
s:s0,u1:u1,X:j,u2:u2,Z:b
]
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(31) ...
A: Jake hit Bill.
QUD: p1?: μ?1[s0,u1,u2]
B: No, he patted him on the back.
QUD: p1? ≺ p2?: μ?2[s0,u1,u2]
A: Ah. p2 accepted, p2?, p1? downdated.
TOPICAL: 〈 question:p2?; fact:soa(p2) 〉
A: Is Bill going to the party tomorrow?
QUD: p3?: μ?3[s1,u1]
TOPICAL: 〈 question:p3?; fact: 〉
s1 and u1 are the available situations in TOPICAL at this point.
s1 is the party situation and so, without special information, there
is no evidence for a unique male there. The referent of u1 is Bill,
so he is the sole possible anaphorisible entity:
B: No. Is #he/Jake? (‘he’ cannot felicitously refer to Jake, despite
the fact that the equivalent utterance using a directly referential
expression is perfectly coherent).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The ﬁrst draft of this paper was written while I was visiting the De-
partment of Linguistics at Go¨teborg University, supported by INDI
assignments provided here are abbreviated in that they contain merely situa-
tions, the objects controlling pronominal resolution. Finally, the notation μ?1
refers to the y/n-question abstract, corresponding to a propositional abstract,
analogously to the y/n-question p? corresponding to the proposition p, as
illustrated in (30).
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.23
24 JONATHAN GINZBURG
(Information Exchange in Dialogue), Riksbankens Jubileumsfond 1997-
0134: I would like to thank Robin Cooper and Elisabet Engdahl for
inviting me and the members of the department for their hospitality:
Subsequent work was supported by grant number R00022269 from
the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom:
Portions of the material herein has been presented at Go¨teborg, at
the Human Communication Research Centre, Edinburgh, at the 6th
International Head Driven Phrase Structure Grammar Conference, Ed-
inburgh, and at the 15th Annual Meeting of the Israeli Association for
Theoretical Linguistics in Haifa: I would like to thank Jens Alwood,
Robin Cooper, Elisabet Engdahl, Yehuda Falk, Stephen Isard, Dimitra
Kolliakou, Shalom Lappin, Staﬀan Larsson, Joachim Nivre, Massimo
Poesio, Mark Steedman, and David Traum for their comments, as well
as three anonymous reviewers for IWCS-3 in Tilburg, 1999.
References
Asher, N.: 1993, Reference to Abstract Objects in English: a Philosophical
Semantics for Natural Language Metaphysics, Studies in Linguistics and
Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Barwise, J. and J. Perry: 1983, Situations and Attitudes, Bradford Books.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Carpenter, B.: 1993, ‘Skeptical and credulous default uniﬁcation with appli-
cations to templates and inheritance’. In: V. d. P. T. Briscoe, A. Copestake
(ed.): Inheritance, Defaults, and the Lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cooper, R.: 1996, ‘The Role of Situations in Generalized Quantiﬁers’. In:
S. Lappin (ed.): Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Cooper, R.: 1998, ‘Mixing Situation Theory and Type Theory to Formalize
Information States in Dialogue Exchanges’. In: J. Hulstijn and A. Nijholt
(eds.): Proceedings of TwenDial 98, 13th Twente workshop on Language
Technology. Twente: Twente University.
Dekker, P.: 1997, ‘First Order Information Exchange’. In: G. Jaeger
and A. Benz (eds.): Proceedings of MunDial 97 (Technical Report 97-
106). Muenchen: Universitaet Muenchen Centrum fuer Informations- und
Sprachverarbeitung.
Fletcher, C.: 1994, ‘Levels of Representation in Memory for Discourse’. In:
M. A. Gernsbacher (ed.): Handbook of Psycholinguistics. Academic Press.
Garrod, S. and A. Sanford: 1994, ‘Resolving Sentences in a Discourse Context’.
In: M. A. Gernsbacher (ed.): Handbook of Psycholinguistics. Academic Press.
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.24
FRAGMENTING MEANING 25
Gawron, M. and S. Peters: 1990, Anaphora and Quantiﬁcation in Situation
Semantics, CSLI Lecture Notes. Stanford: California: CSLI.
Ginzburg, J.: 1995, ‘Resolving Questions, I’. Linguistics and Philosophy 18,
459–527.
Ginzburg, J.: 1996, ‘Interrogatives: Questions, Facts, and Dialogue’. In:
S. Lappin (ed.): Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Ginzburg, J.: 1997, ‘Structural Mismatch in Dialogue’. In: G. Jaeger
and A. Benz (eds.): Proceedings of MunDial 97 (Technical Report 97-
106). Muenchen: Universitaet Muenchen Centrum fuer Informations- und
Sprachverarbeitung, pp. 59–80.
Ginzburg, J.: 1998, ‘Clarifying Utterances’. In: J. Hulstijn and A. Nijholt
(eds.): Proceedings of TwenDial 98, 13th Twente workshop on Language
Technology. Twente: Twente University, pp. 11–30.
Ginzburg, J.: 1999, ‘Ellipsis Resolution with Syntactic Presuppositions’. In:
H. Bunt and R. Muskens (eds.): Computing Meaning: Current Issues in
Computational Semantics. Kluwer.
Ginzburg, J.: 2001, Semantics and Interaction in Dialogue. Stanford: Cali-
fornia: CSLI Publications and Cambridge University Press. Draft chapters
available from http://www.dcs.kcl.ac.uk/staﬀ/ginzburg.
Ginzburg, J. and R. Cooper: 2001, ‘Resolving Ellipsis in Clariﬁcation’. In:
Proceedings of the 39th Meeting of the Association for Computational
Linguistics.
Ginzburg, J., H. Gregory, and S. Lappin: 2001, ‘SHARDS: Fragment Reso-
lution in Dialogue’. In: H. Bunt (ed.): Proceedings of the 1st International
Workshop on Computational Semantics. Tilburg: ITK, Tilburg University.
Ginzburg, J. and I. A. Sag: 2000, Interrogative Investigations: the form,
meaning and use of English Interrogatives, No. 123 in CSLI Lecture Notes.
Stanford: California: CSLI Publications.
Hamblin, C. L.: 1970, Fallacies. London: Methuen.
Hintikka, J. and J. Kulas: 1985, Anaphora and Deﬁnite Descriptions, Synthese
Language Library. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Kamp, H.: 1990, ‘Prologmena to a structural theory of belief and other atti-
tudes’. In: C. Anderson and J. Owens (eds.): The Role of Content in Logic,
Language and Thought, CSLI Lecture Notes. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Milward, D.: 1995, ‘Integrating Situations into a theory of discourse anapho-
ra’. In: P. Dekker and M. Stokhof (eds.): Proceedings of the 10th Amsterdam
Colloquium. ILLC, Amsterdam.
Paul, M.: 1996, ‘Success in Referential Communication’. Ph.D. thesis,
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh.
Poesio, M.: 1993, ‘A situation–theoretic formalization of deﬁnite description
interpretation in plan elaboration dialogues’. In: P. Aczel, D. Israel, Y.
Katagiri, and S. Peters (eds.): Situation Theory and Its Applications, III,
CSLI Lecture Notes Number 37. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.25
26 JONATHAN GINZBURG
Webber, B.: 1991, ‘Structure and Ostension in the Interpretation of Discourse
Deixis’. Language and Cognitive Processes 14, 107–135.
book.tex; 16/07/2001; 11:06; p.26
